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POLITICAL THEOLOGY: 
RELIGION AS LEGITIMIZING FICTION IN 
ANTIQUE AND EARLY MODERN CRITIQUE
Jan Assmann
In Greek texts of the fifth and fourth centuries we encountcr the 
idea that rcligion, the belief in gods and their worship, is a human 
invention in the service of political power and social control. The 
earliest and most radical text, known under the designation of “the 
fragment of Critias” is an excerpt from a satirical play believed to 
be by Critias but now more convincingly attributed to Euripides.1 It 
is a speech put into the blasphemous mouth of Sisyphos, saying that 
thc fear of the gods is nothing but the invention of a shrewd, intel- 
ligent and thoughtful man, meant to intimidate the wicked and keep 
them from committing evil in thought, word or deed. The problem 
is ‘the evil’ which is undiscovered and undiscoverable, committed in 
concealment and seclusion beyond the reach of public control. Starting 
from this calculation, he introduced the belief in gods. The idea of 
omniscient deities should persuade humans to keep the laws, even
where no witnesses were present.
This can be read, both, as a critique of and an apology for reli- 
gion. Religion is a fiction, but a legitimate fiction, because without 
rcligion there would be no law and social order; the weak would 
not be sheltered from the greed of the strong and crime would mul- 
tiply without proportion. Any form of civil society requires the belief 
in god(s). A similar argument is used by Polybios in a fully positive 
sense. This author ascribes the success of Rome to the absolutely 
dominant position which the Romans gave religion within the struc- 
ture of their state. “The greatest advantage of the Roman republic”, 
he writes, “seems to me to lie in the belicf in gods {peri theon dialep- 
sei)”2 The Romans, he continues, granted this position to religion 
“for the sake of the masses” {dia plethous charin), a statement which 
seems to anticipate Marx’s famous diction “Opium of the people.”
2 The following quotations are taken from Siculus (1969: 56.6-12).
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For this reason, Polybios continues, “the ancients seem to me to 
have deliberately inspired the masses with the ideas about the gods 
(peri theon ennoias) and the belief in the netherworld.” Moreover, they 
had created tragedy as a medium to arouse visions of horror and 
anxiety in the masses in order to discipline them: “The masses are 
careless and full of illegal desires. The only means to restrain them 
is by vague fears (adelois phobois) and by such a spectacle (tragodia:).” 
Polybios recognizes religion as a fiction, it is true, but as a great civ- 
ilizing achievement and the foundation of social order, peace and 
harmony: thus, a “legitimate fiction.” According to Polybios, it would 
be extremely unreasonable to cure the masses of these imaginations.
Still, Polybios, unlike Critias or Euripides, distinguishes between 
‘religion’ and ‘popular beliefs.’ He does not say that the gods are 
fictitious, but that mass religion rests on fictitious concepts and imag- 
inations. Mass religion is fictitious because it fulfils a political func- 
tion. The political function of religion both legitimizes and criticizes. 
It legitimizes religion because it argues that the belief in gods is indis- 
pensable for political order and social harmony, and it criticizes it 
by exposing its fictitious character. Cicero, in De Natura Deorum, stresses 
the critical character of this argument, postulating that by repre- 
senting the belief in gods in its totality as an invention of smart 
politicians, religion altogether is destroyed.3 In Roman history, Numa 
Pompilius was held to be a model of such a smart politician. He 
appears in Roman tradition almost as a clone of Moses. Numa was 
said to have referred to the nymph Egeria as the source of his leg- 
islation just as Moses referred tojahveh. Like Moses, Numa codified 
these laws in a book. Unlike Moses, however, he took this book 
along in his tomb instead of leaving it to posterity, thereby protect- 
ing it from later manipulation. In Roman tradition, Numa appears 
as a wise ruler and not as a religious impostor. He acquired this 
negative attribute only in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
The notorious pamphlet De Tribus Impostoribus exposing Moses, Jesus, 
and Mohammed as the prototypes of religious invention for politi- 
cal purposes quotes Numa as the most important pagan parallel, 
dedicating a whole chapter to him.4
3 “Quid i, qui dixerunt totam de dis immortalibus opinionam fictam esse ab 
hominibus sapientibus rei publicae causa, ut, quos ratio non posset, eos religio ad 
officium duceret, nonne omnem religionem funditus sustulerunt?” (Cicero 1995: 106).
4 Schroder (1992: 72).
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An equally ambivalent statement is provided by Diodorus Siculus 
in a passage concerning the six great legislators of humanity. Diodorus 
intends for his account to be a demonstration of wise statesmanship 
without any critical, let alone denunciating, tendencies. In the sev- 
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, however, this passage became the 
most influential argument for exposing religion’s fictitious character 
and political function. Moreover, it is the only quotation within the 
pagan critique of religion that explicidy mendons Moses. The first 
of these legislators, whom Diodorus calls Mnevis or Menas or Menes, 
is said to have stated that Hermes gave him these laws. In the same 
manner, Minos among the Cretes referred to Zeus, Lycurgus among 
the Spartans to Apollon, Zoroaster among the ‘Arians’ (arianoi = 
Persians) to Agathos Daimon (= Ahura Mazda), Zalmoxis among 
the Getans to Hesda and Moses among the Jews to Iao (= Yahveh).5 
Again, Diodorus or his informant, perhaps Hecataeus of Abdera, 
does not aim at a critique of religion, but he rather describes this 
strategy, the framing of legislation by polidcal theology, as a highly 
successful and fully legitimate device for the foundation of states and 
larger communities. In the fifteenth century, this passage providcd 
the model for Marsilio Ficino’s concept of ‘theologia prisca.’ Ficino 
intcrpreted the notions of legislation and the founding of states in 
thc sense of theology and the founding of religions and replaced the 
great legislators with his concept of the ancient “sagesf Hermes 
Trismegist, Zoroaster, Moses, Oqtheus, Pythagoras etc., who con- 
veyed to humanity both religion and the rules of social order and 
civilized life.
Even in the first half of the seventeenth century, Gabriel Naude 
(1600—1652) in his famous Considerations politiques sur les coups d'Etal 
could still quote and even enlarge Diodorus’ argument in a totally 
neutral, uncritical sense:
Tous les anciens Legislateurs voulant autoriser, affermir & bien fonder 
les Loix qu’ils donnoient a leurs peuples, n’ont point eu de meilleur 
moi'en de le faire, qu’en publiant & faisant croire (. . .] qu’ils les avoient 
rec^ues de quelque Divinite: Zoroastre, d Oromasis, Trismegiste de 
Mercure, Zalmoxis de Vesta, Charondas de Saturne, Minos dejupiter, 
Lycurgue d’Apollon, Drago & Solon de Minerve, Numa de la nymphe 
Egerie, Mahomet de l’Ange Gabriel; & Moise, qui a ete le plus sage
5 Siculus (1956-1957: 94.1-2).
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de tous, nous decrit en l’Exode comme il regut la sienne immediate- 
ment de DIEU.6
It was only in the latter part of the seventeenth century that some 
‘free thinkers’ discovered the critical potential in this tradition. Political 
theology came to be seen not only as the instrumentalization, but 
also as the invention of religion for polidcal purposes. Arguing that 
religion served a function in the civilization of mankind and the 
build-up of political communities inevitably implied the critique that 
it is nothing but a function of politics, a fraudulent invention. The sev- 
enteenth chapter of the French Traite des Trois Imposteurs starts with 
this quote from Naude and turns it into a devastating critique of 
religion, or, to be more precise, of ‘revealed religion’- that is, of 
monotheism.7 The French pamphlet bears the name of Spinoza in 
its subtitle: Traite des Trois Imposteurs ou Tlesprit de Monsieur de Spinosa. 
It is obvious that the publication of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico- 
Politicus (1670) marks the turning point in the reception of Diodorus 
and the tradition about the six legislators. It is thus not inadequate 
to subsume the whole debate on the political instrumentalization or 
invention of religion under the term ‘Political theology.’ From Spinoza 
to Bakunin, political theology is a polemical term, denouncing theol- 
ogy or religion as the handmaid of politics.
Among the most interesting contributions to the debate about polit- 
ical theology are John Toland’s Adeisidaemon, dealing with Numa 
Pompilius and with Cicero’s summary of the Greek critique of reli- 
gion,8 and Origines Judaicae, publishcd together in 1709, dcaling with 
Moses and taking Diodorus’ passage on the six lawgivers as its start- 
ing point. In this booklet, Toland opposes the Biblical Moses, who 
followed the general principle in “inventing” (jinxisse) a deity as the 
author of his legislation, with Moses of Strabon (Moses Strabonicus), 
who, conversely, rejected the principle or strategy of political theol- 
ogy in radical fashion.9
According to Strabo, an Egyptian priest named Moses, who felt 
dissatisfied with Egyptian religion, decided to found a new religion, 
and emigrated with his followers to Palestine. He rejected the Egyptian 
tradition of representing the gods in zoomorphic images. His reli-
6 Naude (1988: 118 pp.).
7 Berti (1994: 198); Schroder (1992).
8 Toland (1709).
9 See Assmann (1998: 134 pp.).
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gion consisted of the recognition of only ‘One Divine Being’ whom 
no image could represent: “which encompasses us all, including earth 
and sea, that which we call the heavens, the world and the essence 
of things—this one thing only is God.” The only way to approach 
this god is to live by natural law, in virtue and in justice. Later on, 
the Hebrews deviated from the purity of this doctrine and devel- 
oped superstitious habits, such as dietary prohibitions, circumcision 
and various other laws.
Toland constructs the opposition between Egyptian traditional reli- 
gion, with which Moses is said to have been dissatisfied, and the neui 
religion instituted by Moses, in terms of political versus natural reli- 
gion. He supplies the reasons for Moses’ dissatisfaction by drawing 
on another passage in Diodorus, saying that each nome or province 
had its own deity ever since a certain, very sagely, prince (“sapien- 
tissimus quidam princeps”) came to stabilize the concord of the king- 
dom by introducing a pluralistic and polytheistic religion (“variam 
& miscellam induxit religionem”), and thereby to prevent a con- 
spiracy among the Egyptians. Polytheism, according to Diodorus and 
Toland, has a political purpose. It stresses the political divisions and 
sub-identities by instituting tutelary deities, thus preventing unification 
and the formation of one political will, which this over-sage ruler 
seems to liave feared as potentially rebellious. Strabon’s Moses, in 
turn, was a deist and an iconoclast. Hc held God to be “Nature, or 
matter, mcchanically arranged and acting without conscience and 
intelligence” (“Naturam, vel mundi materiam mechanice dispositam 
et absque ullam consia intelligentiam agentem”) and was a fierce 
enemy of idolatry. Even the Bible shows that he did not make any 
mention of the immortality of the soul nor of a future state of reward 
or punishment. The name by which he called his god means just 
“necessariam solummodo existentiam,” necessary existence or “what 
exists by himself” (“quod per se existit”), in the same sense that the 
Greek “to on” denotes the incorruptible, eternal, and interminable 
world. Toland obviously thinks of Ex. 3:14 where God presented 
himself to Moses: “I am that I am,” or, in the version of the LXX: 
“ego eimi ho on” = “I am the Being one” or simply “I am Being.” 
Moses was not an atheist, but a pantheist, or, to speak in confor- 
mity with more recent usage, a Spinozist.
Toland explains what Strabon describes as a later depravation of 
Moses’ religion, with its innumerable commandments and prohibi- 
tions, by quoting a passage from Ezekiel: “But I shall give them
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statutes that are not good and laws by which they cannot live,” 
(“Ego etiam dederam ipsis statuta non bona et Jura per quae non 
vivere possent”).10 In this way, religion turned into ‘superstition.’ The 
same distinction between religion and superstition occurs also in 
Toland’s other pamphlet, Adeisidaemon. Here, ‘religion of reason’ is 
viewed as the only valid religion. Superstition is denounced a pseudo- 
religion, unable to withstand the criteria of reason, and invented by 
humans only for the purpose of supporting the political order in the 
sense of political theology. Political theology is a phenomenon of 
degeneration and the hallmark of ‘false religion.’
Even more orthodox authors such as Alexander Ross availed them- 
selves of this same argument. For them, political theology is the hall- 
mark of pagan religion. In his book Pansebeia Ross writes: “All false 
Religions are grounded upon Policy,” that is, “humane Policy to 
keep people in obedience and awe of their superiours”.11 Similarly, 
the most important and influential treatment of questions concern- 
ing revelation and political theology, Bishop Warburton’s The Divine 
Legation of Moses, has to be seen within this tradition.12 Warburton, 
however, is more of a classical scholar than a theologian. He agrees 
with Ross that polytheism or paganism is political theology and a 
human fiction, but he follows the antique tradition in taking these 
inventions as indispensable and therefore legitimate fictions without 
which all political and social order would collapse. Warburton gives 
two explanations for the political function of polytheism, one based 
on Critias and the other on Strabo. Polytheism, as political theol- 
ogy, fulfils two functions: first, the function of founding public morals 
and obedience to the laws, and, secondly, the function of mirroring 
and expressing on the divine plane the various distinctions and iden- 
tities that make up the political and social world—the distinctions 
between nations, provinces and cities, and between classes, tribcs and 
professional groups. Both functions cooperate to keep the subjects 
under control. Therefore, every society aiming at social order and 
political power must of necessity form a pantheon of tutelary deities,
10 Ez. 20, 25. Toland deploys several other passages from the prophets rejecting 
cult on behalf of “nature” (on behalf of justice, to be precise, but this distinction 
seems to be immaterial in Toland’s context).
11 The quotations are taken from the second edition, which was published in 
1653 (Schroder 1998: 228).
12 Warburton (1778); Assmann (1998: 138-170).
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by elevating important legislators, heroes and kings to the ranks of 
gods, and ascribing to them supervisory functions of the laws and 
personihcations of political and social identities. But Warburton also 
takes the pagan gods to be a necessary, indispensable, and legitimate 
hction, without which civil society could not last. Both, polytheism 
and idolatry, originate from and correspond to a polidcal necessity, 
and form the political theology of paganism.13
So far, we have encountered four different positions concerning 
the political function of religion. All four agree in declaring politi- 
cal theology or political religion as false or hctitious. They differ in 
what they conceive of as truth in opposition to political theology. 
The most radical position, which is also the earliest attested one, is 
the position of Sisyphos in Critias’ or Euripides’ play Sisyphos. He 
declares religion as such and in toto to be a political hction, imply- 
ing the truth to be atheism. Less radical is Polybios’ position, who 
speaks only of popular religion as a political hction, implying that 
there is also a true or elite religion which is inaccessible to the masses. 
The position presented by the treatise De Tribus Impostoribus and also 
by the Spinozist Traite des trois imposteurs implies the opposition between 
revealed religion as false, because of its political function, and nat- 
ural religion as true. The fourth position, for which we quoted 
Alexander Ross in the seventeenth and William Warburton in the 
eighteenth centuries, declares pagan religions to be false because they 
only serve political functions, and biblical religion to be true because 
it is based not on hction but on revelation.
Warburton, however, being a classical scholar, combines the posi- 
tion of Polybios with that of Alexandcr Ross. He reconstructs pagan 
religions as “doublc religions” displaying an exoteric and an esoteric 
side. The political function and the hctitious character concerns only 
thc exotcric side of pagan religion. The esoteric side, the ‘mysteries,’ 
are free of any political instrumentalization. This is also the reason 
for their concealment. The mysteries do not legitimize or support 
the state at all, because they are about nature or natural theology 
and nature, accordingly, would not know oi moral obligations and
13 It is important to realize that neither the atheist nor the deist critics of polit- 
ical theology and even those orthodox theologians who interpret political theology 
as the hallmark of paganism never put into doubt the necessity of theological fictions. 
Even the atheists, except extremists such as Knutzen and Meslier, do not plead for 
anarchy. See Schroder (1998: 228 pp.).
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political or social identities. But Warburton’s theory is even more 
complex because, besides being a classical scholar, friend of Alexander 
Pope and editor of Shakespeare’s works, he was also a bishop for 
the Anglican church; as such, he was constrained to reserve the high- 
est place for revealed religion. This forced him to distinguish not 
only between false, i.e. political, and true, i.e. natural religion, but 
also between pagan and Christian religion. Pagan religion is not false 
but “double,” comprising an exoteric political and an esoteric nat- 
ural religion, as opposed to biblical religion which, because it is based 
on revelation, is simple.
Warburton’s monumental work, nine books in three volumes, met 
with a very widespread and vivid reception; though not for its ortho- 
dox superstructure, but rather because of its theory of double or 
‘mysterious’ religion. It was read as demonstrating that every reli- 
gion, including biblical monotheism, had the structure of a double 
religion: a state-supportive, legitimizing fayade and an esotcric inside, 
the mysteries of nature. It thus became a basic text for freemasonry. 
In 1786 and 1787, Carl Leonhard Reinhold, ajesuit, student of phi- 
losophy, freemason and illuminate, wrote a book on the “Hebrew 
Mysteries or the Oldest Religious Freemasonry”14 that was based on 
Warburton. This became a basic text not only for Masonic, but 
much wider circles of Deism, Enlightenment and philosophy, espe- 
cially by mediation of Schiller, who condensed Reinhold’s arguments 
and demonstrations into a widely read essay Die Sendung Moses.15
Reinhold equates the concept of ‘nature’ as the supreme deity of 
natural religion with Isis, the goddess of the Egyptian mysteries, who, 
in the inscription on her “veiled image at Sais” presents herself with 
the words “I am all that is, was and will be. No mortal unlifted my 
veil.” This, according to Reinhold, is the deity in whose mysteries 
Moses was initiated when he was educated as a prince at the Pharaonic 
court. When Moses later returned to his native people, he wanted 
to acquaint his people with the deity of the mysteries, whose pre- 
sentation he translated for them not as “I am all that is,” but as “I 
am Being.” This is how Reinhold interprets Ex 3:14, “elTyeh asher 
eheyeh” (“I am that I am”). However, because Moses wanted to 
include the whole people into the mysteries of nature, and because
14 A quote from Karl Leonhard Reinhold [1788]. See Assmann (2001).
15 Schiller (1968: 737-757); Assmann (1998: 186 205); Hartwich (1997: 21-47).
POLITICAL THEOLOGY 201
he could not possibly “initiate” them (an educational process taking 
many years and requiring only the strongest and most intelligent 
minds), he had to turn the mysteries of Isis into a public and polit- 
ical religion, based on blind belief and obedience, and to turn Isis, 
the sublime deity of the mysteries, into Yahveh, a national god. Thus 
biblical monotheism, because of its political function in supporting 
the Jewish nation and commonwealth, has to be classified among 
the false religions—its only element of truth, which Moses was able 
to rescue from the Egyptian mysteries, being the unity or oneness 
of God.
Yet according to Schiller, Moses was not an impostor, but just an 
“accommodator.” According to Schiller “His enlightened mind and 
his sincere and noble heart” had revolted against the idea of giving 
his people a false and fabulous god. But the truth, the religion of 
reason and nature, was equally impossible to reveal. Eventually, the 
only solution was to proclaim the truth in a fabulous way and to 
endow the true god with some fictitious properties and qualities that 
the people would be able to grasp and to believe in."' 1 hus, Moses 
couched his vision of truth in the illusionistic form of a national god 
and a national cult, including the whole ‘hieroglyphic’ symbolism of 
lustrations, sacrifices, processions, oracles, and so forth. VVith Schiller 
we approach thc point where religion is defined as "Opium of the 
people” (Marx) and as an “illusion” (Freud).
Through this transformation process, the topic of political theol- 
ogy finally reached Mikhail Alcksandrovitch Bakunin (1814-1876), 
the exponent of romanticist anarchy, who no longer concedes reli- 
gion’s legitimacy and indispensability as political fiction. His motto 
is the inversion of Voltaire’s verse “Si dieu n’existait pas il faudrait 
l’inventer,” which proclaimed: “Si dieu existait il faudrait l’abolir” 
(“If God existed hc should be abolished”). Up to Bakunin, almost 
all critics of religion, including Sisyphos in Euripides’ play, agreed 
that, without the fiction of god or gods, all moral, legal and political 
order would vanish. Bakunin, on the other hand, holds that religion
16 “Should he proclaim to them a false and fabulous god, against whom his rea- 
son revolts, whom he learned in the mysteries to detest? For this, his mind is too 
enlightened, his heart too noble and sincere. . . . How may these contradictions may 
reconciled? He cannot proclaim the true god to the Hebrews, because their mind 
is unable to grasp him; he does not want to give them a false god because he 
despises this adverse role. Nothing is left to him but to proclaim to them his true 
god in a fabulous way” (Assmann 2001: 756 pp., my translation).
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must be abolished because of its political theology. Political theology 
has now become an unequivocally polemical term, denouncing reli- 
gion as a tool of oppression in the hands of the ruling classes. Religion 
can and must be disposed of, because humankind has the reason 
and the power of their own to establish institutions of decent society.
It is in Bakunin’s writings that Carl Schmitt detected the term 
‘political theology’ and redefined it in a positive sense. Schmitt does 
not share Bakunin’s positive anthropology. Instead, he falls back to 
the pessimistic anthropology of Christianity in general with its doc- 
trine of original sin, and to the seventeenth century in particular and 
Hobbes’ ideas of the natural state as bellum omnium contra omnes. In 
the light of such a pessimistic view of man, not religion, but politi- 
cal order, the state, becomes indispensable. Again, the notion of 
indispensability acquires a religious aura. Political power is good, 
because it is indispensable, and this goodness or sacredness of power 
is expressed by St. Paul in the words that it is “of God.” Not “false 
religion is political,” but “true politics is theological;” summarizes 
Schmitt’s version of the debate on the relation between religion and 
politics. True politics is theological because it knows that its power 
comes from God. All the salient political concepts—this is Schmitt’s 
thesis—are secularized theological concepts. With Schmitt, political 
theology is still a polemic, but with the direction of the polemic rad- 
ically changed—even inverted. It no longer implies a critique of reli- 
gion, but a critique of politics. False politics is denounced by political 
theology as neglectful of its divine fundaments and origins. False pol- 
itics bases itself on a positive anthropology, imagining that it could 
do without God. False politics—still according to Carl Schmitt—is 
the politics of secularism, individualism, democracy, and free-market 
economy, the politics of sovereign, autonomous, this-worldly man, 
believing himself able to negotiate the principles of truth, order and 
justice on a totally secular and rational basis.
In a particular fashion, Schmitt is right to use the term “political 
theology” as a critique of politics; this corresponds to the original 
meaning of biblical monotheism. In the Books Exodus through 
Deuteronomy, monotheism is represented as a liberation movement, 
directed against pharaonic totalitarianism. In the confrontation between 
Egypt and Israel, Egypt stands for oppression, humiliation, and de- 
humanization, while Israel stands for the principles of decent soci- 
ety. The original meaning of biblical monotheism is deeply political 
and its theology is, above all, political theology, i.e. covenant theology.
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This is, however, not what Carl Schmitt had in mind. The sover- 
eign state which Schmitt advocated corresponds more to ancient 
Egypt than to ancient Israel.
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